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NOTES 
ADMISSIBILITY OF AN OUT-OF-COURT CONFESSION: 
INABILITY TO MAKE AN IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION 
OF THE DEFENDANT AS THE OUT-OF-COURT 
CONFESSOR, DESPITE EXACTNESS OF NAMES AND 
OTHER CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF IDENTITY, 
GOES TO THE ADMISSIBILITY RATHER THAN TO THE 
WEIGHT OF THE CONFESSION. Woodson v. State, 325 
Md. 251, 600 A.2d 420 (1992). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Maryland courts admit hearsay into evidence if it qualifies as 
an exception to the hearsay rule. l Prior to admitting hearsay evidence 
under a hearsay exception, the proponent of the evidence must lay 
a foundation to prove the identity of the out-of-court declarant. 2 
Often, proponents of hearsay rely on circumstantial evidence to prove 
identity.3 In many cases where only a name of the out-of-court 
declarant is known, the presumption that "identity of names gives 
rise to identity of person" (the identity presumption) is used to link 
the out-of-court declarant with another individual.4 
Generally, a criminal confession is admissible if, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, it was made knowingly and voluntarily.s 
Courts have had little occasion to address the standard of proof 
required for admissibility of a hearsay confession when the identity 
of the confessor is in question. Jurisdictions which have addressed 
this issue generally follow the same procedure typically used to 
determine the admissibility of hearsay evidence; namely that circum-
stantial evidence is allowed to prove the identity of the out-of-court 
declarant. 6 Therefore, the identity presumption may be used as cir-
1. See infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
2. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. 
3. See infra notes 89-99 and accompanying text. 
4. See infra notes 100-53 and accompanying text. 
5. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (addressing the "knowing 
and voluntary" standard for admissibility of confessions); see also Clay v. 
State, 211 Md. 577, 585, 128 A.2d 634, 638 (1957) (referring to the "knowing 
and voluntary" standard). 
6. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. 
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cumstantial evidence to identify the out-of-court confessor.7 After 
presenting all circumstantial evidence of identity, any remaining 
uncertainty as to the identity of the confessor affects only the weight 
given to the confession by the jury, not its admissibility.s 
In Woodson v. State,9 however, the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land rejected this approach. A witness' inability to make an in-court 
identification of the criminal defendant as the out-of-court confessor, 
even when the witness offered other circumstantial evidence to prove 
identity, resulted in the inadmissibility of the confession. lO The Wood-
. son court held that failure to provide sufficient evidence linking the 
out-of-court confessor and the defendant on trial affects the admis-
sibility of the confession, not merely the weight that the jury would 
ultimately give the confession during deliberations. II 
II. FACTS 
On October 10, 1989, defendant Shawn Woodson, along with 
four other individuals, purchased heroin and proceeded to an apart-
ment building where one of the individuals lived. 12 There, the group 
of five snorted the heroin.13 Officer William J. Martin of the Balti-
more City Police Department responded to a call regarding drug use 
in a stairwell. 14 As he arrived, the group of five, including the 
defendant, scattered. IS Two of the five individuals entered one of the 
apartments. 16 Another individual, on his way out of the building, 
encountered Officer Martin, who frisked him and let him gO.17 Of 
the two individuals remaining, one was the defendant. ls The other 
individual was named Taavon Hall. 19 
Two backup officers, Officer Herman Brooks and Officer Robin 
Johnson, responded shortly thereafter. 20 As they entered through the 
rear basement door, a shot was heard, followed by a pause and two 
7. See infra notes 100-53 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra notes 100-53 and accompanying text. 
9. 325 Md. 251,600 A.2d 420 (1992). 
10. [d. at 262-63, 600 A.2d at 425. 
11. [d. 
12. [d. at 253, 600 A.2d at 421. 
13. [d. 
14. [d. at 252-53, 600 A.2d at 420-21. 
15. [d. at 253, 600 A.2d at 421. 
16. [d. The two individuals who entered the apartment were identified as Tyrone 
McQueen and Dale Truly. Both individuals entered Truly's apartment. [d. 
17. [d. The court identified this individual as Shawn Hawkins. [d. 
18. [d. at 254, 600 A.2d at 421. 
19. [d. at 253, 600 A.2d at 421. 
20. [d. at 254, 600 A.2d at 421. 
1993] Woodson v. State 391 
more shots.21 Hall then ran out the front door, while defendant 
Woodson ran downstairs toward the rear door, where Officers Brooks 
and Johnson stood. 22 In an exchange of gunfire between Officer 
Brooks and defendant Woodson, Officer Brooks was shot in the 
hand and in the chest, and Woodson was shot in the mid-groin 
area.23 Because of a bullet proof vest, Officer Brooks lived, but was 
knocked down.24 As the defendant tried to escape, Officer Johnson 
tripped him and apprehended him.2S Officer Martin was later found 
dead on a first floor landing with twO bullets in his head. 26 A 
handgun was recovered near the rear door where defendant Woodson 
had tried to escape.27 Bullets taken from both Officer Brooks and 
Officer Martin matched this weapon.28 
At trial, the State produced a witness, Andre Spells ,29 who 
testified that .while he was in a cell in Baltimore City thirteen days 
after the incident, a man who identified himself as Shawn Woodson 
confessed to the crime.30 Spells indicated that he spent two nights 
and one day with this individuap· and that this cellmate had a mid-
body injury. 32 Moreover, this cellmate said that his nickname was 
"Buddy."33 Defendant Woodson was also known as Buddy.34 Spells 
also testified that his cellmate described the gun used as a .38()3s and 
21. Id. Officer Brooks testified as to these facts. Id. Officer Seibert, who responded 
to the call, likewise tt;stified that he heard one distinct shot, and then saw Hall 
run from the apartment door. Id. The officer then heard "a couple more 
shots," followed by a "few more shots." Id. Likewise, Officer Pedrick, who 
also responded to the scene, testified that he heard a "loud bang" followed 
by a "volley of gunshots." Id. Officer Pedrick then saw Hall run from the 





26 .. Id. 
27.Id. 
28.Id. 
29. Id. at 255, 600 A.2d at 422. Evidence was introduced at trial that Spells, who 
was being held on theft charges, phoned the police to offer evidence concerning 
the murder of Officer Martin. Id. at 264 n.2, 600 A.2d at 426 n.2. Spells 
admitted that he wanted to cooperate for his own benefit. Moreover, Spells 
said he asked Woodson questions because, "I thought maybe it could help me 
somewhere along the line." Id. 
30. Id. at 255, 600 A.2d at 421. 
31. Id. at 256, 600 A.2d at 422. 
32. Id. at 258, 600 A.2d at 423. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 259, 600 A.2d at 424. 
35. Id. at 259, 600 A.2d at 423. The police did recover a handgun by the rear 
door where Woodson tried to escape. Id. at 254, 600 A.2d at 421. The facts 
of the case, however, never identified the size of that handgun. Thus, it is not 
known whether Spells' description of the gun was accurate. 
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said that, if one wants to kill someone, the size of the gun is 
irrelevant if the person is shot in the head.36 In addition, Spells 
testified that this cellmate said that the shooting occurred in a 
hallway.37 Furthermore, it was noted that the conversation between 
Spells and the individual who identified himself as Shawn Woodson 
occurred approximately six and a half months prior to the trial.38 
At trial, Spells could not positively identify the defendant as the 
same individual with whom he shared a jail cell some six and ~ half 
months earlier. 39 Defense counsel objected to the use of Spells' 
testimony on the ground that, because Spells could not identify the 
defendant as the speaker, anything to which Spells testified was 
hearsay evidence made outside the presence of the defendant, and 
was thus inadmissible.40 The defendant did not take the stand to 
deny the identification.41 The Circuit Court for Baltimore City ad-
mitted the confession, and Woodson was found guilty of the first 
degree murder of Officer Martin and sentenced to death.42 The Court 
of Appeals of Maryland reversed and remanded the case for a new 
trial on the first degree murder charge.43 
III. BACKGROUND 
In order for evidence to be admissible, it must pass numerous 
legal tests, depending on the type of evidence in question.44 When 
36. Id. at 258-59, 600 A.2d at 423. 
37.Id. 
38. Id. at 255 n.l, 600 A.2d at 422 n.1. 
39. Id. at 255, 600 A.2d at 422. 
40. Id. at 257, 600 A.2d at 423. 
41. Id. at 264,600 A.2d at 427. Woodson also argued for reversal of his conviction 
based on the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments referring to 
defendant's failure to testify, but the coup did not address the matter. Id. 
42. Id. at 253, 600 A.2d at 421. Woodson was also found guilty of attempted 
second-degree murder, two counts of use of a handgun in the commission of 
a crime of violence and two counts of carrying a handgun. Id. The trial court 
also sentenced Woodson to thirty years for the attempted second-degree murder 
of Officer Brooks, to be served consecutively with a twenty year sentence for 
each count of use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. Id. 
43. Id. at 267-68, 600 A.2d at 428. On January 29, 1993, Shawn Woodson was 
retried and convicted of second-degree murder and two handgun charges in 
the Baltimore City Circuit Court. Jay Apperson, Woodson Guilty, Escapes 
Death Penalty, Baltimore Sun, Jan. 30, 1993, at 2B. Baltimore City Circuit 
Judge John C. Themelis sentenced Woodson to 53 years, to be served consec-
utively to a 50-year term he was serving in the wounding of Officer Brooks. 
Id. A juror indicated after the trial that the jury didn't believe that the murder 
was premeditated, but instead Woodson "just reacted and tried to get out of 
the building." Id. 
44. For example, all evidence must be relevant. E.g., Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 
638, 643, 350 A.2d 665, 669 (19765. It is '''an elementary rule that evidence, 
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analyzing the admissibility of an oral hearsay confession, assuming 
its relevance, the test is two-fold: The confession must meet the 
admissibility requirements of an appropriate hearsay exception4S and 
it must satisfy the burden of proof requirement governing the ad-
missibility of confessions.46 
A. Satisfying the Hearsay Requirements 
An out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted is hearsay. 47 Generally, testifying witnesses must be. 
present at trial, administered an oath, and subjected to cross-exam-
ination.48 The rule against hearsay was developed to assure compliance 
to be admissible, must be relevant to the issues and must tend either to establish 
or disprove them.''' [d. (quoting Kennedy v. Crouch, 191 Md. 580, 585, 62 
A.2d 582, 585 (1948». Moreover, the best-evidence rule requires a party to 
produce the original of a document instead of a duplicate or a copy. See 
generally Gray v. State, 181 Md. 439, 30 A.2d 744 (1943) (finding the rule 
inapplicable to the offering of testimony that is not documentary evidence). 
Secondary evidence may be received when no better evidence is obtainable. 
Marvil Package Co. v. Ginther, 154 Md. 213, 220, 140 A. 95, 98 (1928). Also, 
documents, in order to be admissible, must be authenticated. See Snyder v. 
Stouffer, 270 Md. 647, 651-52, 313 A.2d 497, 500 (1974) (ruling that a 
photostatic copy of the first page of a safe deposit "ledger contract," offered 
without testimonial predicate, was inadmissible for failure to "authenticate" 
and provide necessary "testimonial sponsorship"). Authentication requires that 
the proponent of the evidence establish the chain of custody. See Amos v. 
State, 42 Md. App. 365, 369-71, 400 A.2d 468, 471-72 (1979); 7 JOHN H. 
WIOMORE, WIOMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2129 (James H. Chadbourn rev. 1978); 
see also Jacobs v. State, 45 Md. App. 634, 647, 415 A.2d 590, 597 (1980) 
("Under the common law of evidence, the three critical questions for admis-
sibility of any evidence are: 1) Is it material; 2) Is it relevant; and 3) Is it 
competent? "). 
45. See Foster v. State, 297 Md. 191, 210, 464 A.2d 986, 996 (1983); Vines v. 
State, 285 Md. 369, 381, 402 A.2d 900, 906 (1979); Bunn v. Warden, 242 Md. 
399, 400, 219 A.2d 37, 38 (1966). 
46. See, e.g., Brittingham v. State, 63 Md. App. 164, 179, 492 A.2d 354, 361 
(1985) (citing Lego v. Twomey, 440 U.S. 477, 489 (1972». 
47. Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 6, 536 A.2d 666, 668, cert. denied, 312 Md. 
602, 541 A.2d 965 (1988) (paraphrasing CHARLES MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE § 246, at 729-30 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter 
MCCORMICK 3D)); FED. R. EVID. 801(c). The Federal Rules of Evidence are in 
effect in about half the states, as well as in the federal courts. CHARLES 
MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 246 (John Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) 
[hereinafter MCCORMICK 4TH]. No state hearsay rule varies significantly from 
the federal rule. [d. 
48. See John S. Strahorn, Jr., A Reconsideration oj the Hearsay Rule and 
Admissions, 85 U. PA. L. REv. 484, 484-86 (1937). See also Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), where the Court stated the following: 
Out-of-court statements are traditionally excluded because they lack 
the conventional indicia of reliability: they are usually not made under 
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with these criterion; the hearsay exclusionary rule is invoked when· 
one of these "ideal conditions" is absent.49 
Even if one of the conditions is absent, however, hearsay is 
nonetheless admissible as evidence if it meets the elements of one of 
the "diverse exceptions to the hearsay rule. "SO Furthermore, the 
hearsay evidence must be supported by sufficient indicia of reliability 
and trustworthiness to satisfy the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United StatesSI and the 
Twenty-First Article of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. s2 The 
burden lies on the proponent of hearsay evidence to prove both 
satisfaction of the hearsay elementsS3 and trustworthiness of the 
oath or other circumstances that impress the speaker with the solemnity 
of his statements; the declarant's word is not subject to cross-exami-
nation; and he is not available in order that his demeanor and 
credibility may be assessed by the jury. 
Id. at 298. 
49. MCCORMICK 4TH, supra note 47, § 245. 
50. Tibbs v. State, 72 Md. App. 239, 246, 528 A.2d 510, 513 (1986), cert. denied, 
311 Md. 286, 533 A.2d 1308 (1987); cj. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 u.S. 56, 66 
(1980) (referring to "firmly rooted hearsay exception[s]"); see also Bailey v. 
State, 327 Md. 689, 612 A.2d 288 (1992) (analyzing whether a letter met the 
requirements of a business record and was therefore admissible as an exception 
to the hearsay rule); Hartless v. State, 327 Md. 558, 578, 611 A.2d 581, 590 
(1992) (determining that if a proponent of hearsay evidence "offers no sug-
gestion of exceptions to the hearsay rule," the evidence is properly excludable); 
Richardson v. State, 324 Md. 611, 624, 598 A.2d 180, 186 (1991) (stating that 
if one or more hearsay statements are contained within another hearsay 
statement, each must fall within an exception to the hearsay rule in order to 
be admissible). 
Rule 802 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states: "Hearsay is not admissible 
except as provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme 
Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress." FED. R. EVID. 
802. While Rule 802 implies a general rule of exclusion with a few exceptions, 
it is sometimes viewed as a general rule allowing hearsay, coupled with a 
narrow exception excluding it. "In the sea of admitted hearsay, the rule 
excluding hearsay is a small and lonely island." Jack B. Weinstein, Probative 
Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REv. 331, 347 (1961). But see Cassidy v. State, 
74 Md. App. I, 7, 536 A.2d 666, 669 (1988) ("Although subject to multitu-
dinous exceptions, the [Hearsay] Rule, in its essence, is a rule of exclusion. "). 
51. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the federal constitution 
requires "that in aU criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. 
VI. This federal provision was not applied to the states until 1965 when the 
Supreme Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment made the federal con-
frontation clause applicable to the states. Pointer v. Texas, 380 u.S. 400, 403 
(1965). Nearly every state has adopted a similar provision. See 5 WIGMORE, 
supra note 44, § 1397. The requirement is applicable only to the accused in a 
criminal prosecution. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411,428-29 (1969). 
52. See State v. Standi fur, 310 Md. 3, 5-6, 526 A.2d 955, 956 (1987). 
53. See Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. I, 8, 536 A.2d 666, 669 (1988). 
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evidence. 54 "[T]he offeror of the hearsay statements [must] provide 
the foundation upon which he asserts admissibility. "55 
The admission procedure for hearsay evidence is as follows. 
After hearsay evidence is offered, the trial judge "ascertains and 
announces the rule of evidence law setting up the criterion of ad-
mission or exclusion. "56 Depending on the hearsay exception being 
used, the proponent of the hearsay evidence is allowed to bring 
forward evidence proving any preliminary facts required to be proved 
under that exception.s' The opposing party offers any disputing 
evidence. 58 The trial judge then makes the final determination whether 
the proponent of the hearsay evidence has answered the preliminary 
factual questions which must be answered in order to apply the 
hearsay exception and admit the evidence. 59 If there is insufficient 
evidence to support the existence of the preliminary facts, the judge 
excludes the evidence.60 If admitted, the "fact finder then gives the 
54. Id. "Hearsay will be excluded, unless the proponent demonstrates its probable 
trustworthiness." Id. (emphasis added). 
55. Id. at 18, 536 A.2d at 674 (1988) (quoting Deloso v. State, 37 Md. App. 101, 
106-07, 376 A.2d 873, 877 (1977»; see also Jacobs v. State, 45 Md. App. 634, 
653, 415 A.2d 590, 601 (1980) ("When dealing with the common law of 
evidence, our predominant consideration is the accuracy of the proffered 
evidence. "). 
56. MCCORMICK 4TH, supra note 47, §53. 
57. Kosmas v. State, 316 Md. 587, 601, 560 A.2d 1137, 1144 (1989) (citing 
MCCORMICK 3D, supra note 47, § 53). 
58.Id. 
59. Id. at 601, 560 A.2d at 1144 (citing MCCORMICK 3D, supra note 47, § 53). 
McCormick recognizes that while issues of fact are usually left to the jury, 
"preliminary questions of fact upon which depends the admissibility of an item 
of evidence that is objected to under an exclusionary rule of evidence" are 
more properly left with the judge: 
If the special question of fact were submitted to the jury when 
objection was made, cumbersome and awkward problems about una-
nimity would be raised. If the judge admitted the evidence ... to the 
jury and directed them to disregard it unless they found that the 
disputed fact existed, the aim of the exclusionary rule would likely be 
frustrated, for two reasons. First, the jury would often not be able 
to erase the evidence from their minds, if they found that the con-
ditioning fact did not exist. They could not if they would. Second, 
the average jury would not be interested in performing this intellectual 
gymnastic of "disregarding" the evidence. They are intent mainly on 
reaching their verdict in a case in accord with what they believe to 
be true, rather than in enforcing the long-term policies of evidence 
law. 
MCCORMICK 4TH, supra note 47, § 53. 
60. Kosmas, 316 Md. at 601, 560 A.2d at 1144. Once one can assume the existence 
of a preliminary fact in question, if there is any contrary evidence, "it [is] 
incumbent upon the judge to determine whether there is any true controversy 
surrounding the preliminary fact," and if there is a controversy, the jury is 
allowed to resolve it. Id. (citing MCCORMICK 3D, supra note 47, § 53); see 
LYNN McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 104.2 (1987). 
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evidence whatever weight it deems appropriate in its preroga~ 
tive. "61 Ultimately, however, the trial judge has the final decision 
with regard to admitting or excluding hearsay evidence. 62 
When attempting to admit into evidence an oral hearsay 
confession63 allegedly obtained from a criminal defendant, two hear-
say exceptions are arguably available: the declaration against interest 
exception64 and the admission by a party-opponent exception.6s Al-
though judicial opinions often fail to distinguish declarations from 
admissions,66 significant differences do exist between these two hear-
say exceptions. 
61. Jacobs v. State, 45 Md. App. 634, 653, 415 A.2d 590, 600 (1980). 
62. [d. 
63. "[T]here is general agreement that the prosecution is entitled to introduce 
confessions." MCCORMICK 4TH, supra note 47, § 144. However, when the 
confession is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of matters 
asserted therein, it is potentially subject to exclusion under the prohibition 
against hearsay. [d. 
64. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). The rule defines a statement against interest as: 
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to 
the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to 
subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid 
a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in 
the declarant's position. would not have made the statement unless 
believing it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant 
to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not 
admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trust-
worthiness of the statement. 
[d. See also Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 278 (1913) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) ("[The] exception to the hearsay rule in the case of declarations 
against interests is well known; no other statement is so much against interest 
as a confession of murder."). 
65. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). The rule defines an admission by a party-opponent 
as: 
The statement is offered against a party and is (A) the party's own 
statement, in either an individual or representative capacity or (B) a 
statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in 
its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to 
make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the 
party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the 
agency of employment, made during the existence of the relationship, 
. or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course 
and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
[d. See a/so 3 WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 816 ("the ground for receiving 
admissions in general ... suffices' also for confessions"); JOHN M. MAGUIRE, 
EVIDENCE OF GUILT § 1.02 (1982) (characterizing confessions as "a specialized 
sort of admission"). Under the federal rules, an admission by a party opponent 
is treated as non-hearsay. FED. R. Evm. 801 (d)(2). However, under Maryland 
law, admissions are treated as an exception to the hearsay rule. Aetna Casualty 
& Sur. Co. v. Kuhl, 296 Md. 446, 455, 463 A.2d 822, 827-28 (1983). 
66. Courts mistakenly combine the two as "admissions against interest" in judicial 
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Declarations against interest include declarations against penaf 
interest. 67 Admitting into evidence a declaration against interest as 
an exception to the hearsay rule is "founded on the assumption that 
a person is unlikely to fabricate a statement that is against his own 
interest."68 Thus, the statement has inherent reliability. A declaration 
against interest need not be a confession, but must involve substantial 
exposure to criminalliability.69 Furthermore, the out-of-court declar-
ant must be unavailable in order to admit hearsay evidence under 
the declaration against interest exception. 70 The assertion of one's 
privilege not to testify renders the witness unavailable to the extent 
of the scope of the privilege.71 
To be admissible, a declaration against penal interest must be 
trustworthy on its face72 and there must be no evidence of collusion.73 
opinions. See Smith v. Branscome, 251 Md. 582, 589,248 A.2d 455, 460 (1968) 
(citing Joppy v. Hopkins, 231 Md. 52, 57, 188 A.2d 545, 548 (1963»; Hynes 
v. Wilson, 147 Md. 360, 363, 128 A. 70, 71 (1925); Corbin v. Staton, 139 Md. 
150, 153, ll5 A. 23, 24 (1921); but see Kekua v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 601 
P.2d 364, 370 n.3 (Haw. 1979) ("The expression, 'admissions against interest,' 
is a misnomer."); Hofer v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 148 N.W.2d 485, 487 
(Iowa 1967) ("'admission against interest' as commonly used may often be 
misleading if not erroneous"). 
67. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 296 Md. 446, 463 A.2d 822. At common law, 
statements against the declarant's penal interest, e.g., statements exposing the 
declarant to criminal liability, did not fall within the declaration against interest 
exception. State v. Standifur, 310 Md. 3, 10 n.2, 526 A.2d 955, 958 n.2 (1987). 
Some states, including Maryland, have broadened the declaration against 
interest exception to include declarations against penal interest. For a thorough 
history of Maryland courts' acceptance of declarations against penal interest, 
see Jacobs v. State, 45 Md. App. 634, 651 n.4, 415 A.2d 590, 600 n.4 (1980) 
(noting that "no Maryland decision has ever overruled a trial verdict because 
a declaration against penal interest was received in evidence"). For articles 
addressing the declaration against penal interest exception, see Michael D. 
Bergeisen, Comment, Federal Rules oj Evidence 804(b)(3) and Inculpatory 
Statements Against Penal Interest, 66 CAL. L. REv. ll89 (1978); Andrew R. 
Keller, Comment, Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest and the Con-
jrontation Clause, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 159 (1983); Peter W. Tague, Perils oj 
the Rulemaking Process: The Development, Application, and Unconstitution-
ality oj Rule 804(b)(3)'s Penal Interest Exception, 69 GEO. L.J. 851 (1981). 
68. Foster v. State, 297 Md. 191, 204, 464 A.2d 986, 993 (1983). 
69. Standifur, 310 Md. at 13, 526 A.2d at 960; see also United States v. Barrett, 
539 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Bagley, 537 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 
1976). 
70. See United States v. Zurosky, 614 F.2d 779 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 
967 (1979); Phillips v. Wyrick, 558 F.2d 489 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
1088 (1977); FED. R. Evm. 804(a)(I); W.J. Dunn, Annotation, Claim 0/ 
Privilege by a Witness as Justifying the Use in Criminal Case 0/ His Testimony 
Given at a Former Trial or Preliminary Examination, 45 A.L.R.2D 1354 (1956). 
71. Zurosky, 614 F.2d at 792. 
72. Jacobs v. State, 45 Md. App. 634, 643, 415 A.2d 590, 595 (1980). 
73. Id. at 650, 415 A.2d at 599. 
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The proponent of the evidence must offer sufficient evidence to fulfill 
all elements of a declaration against interest exception to the hearsay 
rule.74 If the trial judge finds that the declaration against interest is 
trustworthy7s and determines that all factual questions have been 
sufficiently supported, the hearsay evidence will be admitted regard-
less of whether the case is criminal or civil, whether the plaintiff or 
defendant proffers the declaration, or whether the statement is prof-
fered for inculpatory or exculpatory purposes.76 . 
The general rule regarding admission by a party-opponent is that 
an individual's words or acts may be offered against an individual 
as substantive evidence of the facts admitted.77 In such a case, "the 
party cannot complain of an inability to cross-examine himself or 
herself. "78 An admission is admissible as evidence regardless of 
whether the out-of-court declarant is available to testify. 79 Moreover, 
the out-of-court declarant "is not even required to have had firsthand 
knowledge of the matter declared; the declaration may have been 
self-serving when it was made; and the declarant is probably sitting 
in the courtroom."so Nonetheless, "oral admissions of a party are 
'universally deemed admissible' and legally sufficient to prove facts 
admitted."8l 
Proponents offering into evidence an admission of a party-
opponent must lay the foundation for the evidence by satisfying 
three conditions.82 First, the proponent must prove that a party to 
74. See supra note 67 for a definition and elements of a statement against interest. 
75. The Jacobs court warned against failing to recognize the difference between 
trustworthiness of the declaration versus trustworthiness of the witness who is 
testifying as to the declaration: 
The trustworthiness in issue . . . is the trustworthiness of the decla-
ration, assuming it to have been made and to have been made in the 
form recounted from the witness stand. The trustworthiness of the 
witness who serves as the mere conduit for the out-of-court declaration 
is, on the other hand, tested by other devices such as the oath and 
cross-examination at the trial itself. All too frequently, we allow our 
distrust of the witness on the stand to be transmuted into a mistrust 
of the out-of-court declaration, and this frequently subconscious trans-
fer serves only to blur analysis. 
Jacobs, 45 Md. App. at 643 n.2, 415 A.2d at 595 n.2. 
76. [d. at 643, 415 A.2d at 595-96. 
77. E.g., Smith v. Branscome, 251 Md. 582,248 A.2d 455 (1968); Terry v. O'Neal, 
194 Md. 680, 72 A.2d 26 (1950). 
78. McLAIN, supra note 60, § 801(4).2. 
79. MCCORMICK 4TH, supra note 47, § 254. 
80. [d.; see also Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Kuhl, 296 Md. 446, 455, 463 A.2d 
822, 827 (1983). 
81. Branscome, 251 Md. at 589, 248 A.2d at 460 (quoting Lambros v. Coolahan, 
185 Md. 463, 468, 45 A.2d 96, 98 (1945». 
82. McLAIN, supra note 60, § 801(4).1. 
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the action made, adopted, or authorized the statement. 83 Second, the 
statement must be offered by the proponent against the speaking 
party.84 Finally, the statement made must be relevant to a material 
fact in the case. 8S Typically, the party against whom the admission 
is being offered may rebut, contradict, explain, or deny the state-
ment.86 
Additionally, a party attempting to admit an admission of a 
party-opponent or a declaration against interest must lay a foundation 
to prove the identity of the out-of-court declarant.87 "Knowledge of 
the identity of the declarant is essential to establish a proper 
foundation"88 for admissibility of evidence under most of the hearsay 
exceptions. 
1. Use of circumstantial evidence to prove identity of an out-of-
court declarant 
When a witness cannot identify an out-of-court declarant, courts 
in many jurisdictions, including Maryland, rely on circumstantial 
evidence to prove identity. 89 If sufficient circumstantial evidence of 
identity exists, the hearsay evidence will likely be admitted under an 
exception to the hearsay rule. 90 
The use of circumstantial evidence to prove identity is most 
widely used in the situation of identifying a party to a: telephone 
conversation. Failure to adequately identify a party to a telephone 





87. Id. (admission by party-opponent includes showing that the statement was 
made by the party). 
88. United States v. Mouzin, 785 F.2d 682, 692 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 
985 (1986) (denying admissibility of an out-of-court statement under Fed. R. 
Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), statement of a co-conspirator, because of failure to prove 
identity); see also United States v. Christopher, 923 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir. 1991) 
(finding statement of co-conspirator inadmissible as a hearsay exception under 
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) because of failure to prove identity). 
89. See Bulluck v. State, 219 Md. 67, 73, 148 A.2d 433, 436 (1959); Merchant v. 
State, 217 Md. 61, 70, 141 A.2d 487, 492 (1958); Spies v. State, 8 Md. App. 
160, 163, 258 A.2d 758, 759 (1969); see also Christopher, 923 F.2d at 1550-51 
(finding hearsay evidence inadmissible under FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E), where 
identity of out-of-court declarant "barely rises above the level of guesswork"); 
United States v. Dynalectric Co., 859 F.2d 1559, 1582 (lith Cir. 1988) (finding 
statements of declarant admissible under FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) where, 
although witness did not know precise identity of the declarant, identity was 
clear from testimony and context of out-of-court statements). 
90. See supra note 89 and cases cited therein. 
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the conversation inadmissible.91 To avoid exclusion of the evidence 
as hearsay, courts require that proponents of the evidence authenti-
cate the conversation by adequately identifying the unknown party. 92 
Predominantly, proponents rely on circumstantial evidence to au-
thenticate the conversation and admit the contents of that conver-
sation into evidence. 
Authentication basically occurs in two forms: either the testifying 
witness will state that he recognized the voice of the caller or the 
witness can testify to other "sundry circumstances."93 In Maryland, 
these sundry circumstances can include any circumstantial evidence 
91. See Mowen v. State, 11 Md. App. 522, 526, 275 A.2d 174, 176 (1971). In 
Maryland, "[t)he generally accepted rule of evidence ... [is) that in order to 
render the evidence of a telephone conversation of a witness admissible, some 
preliminary testimony, either direct or circumstantial, must be presented to 
establish the identity of the other person to the conversation." White v. State, 
204 Md. 442, 446, 104 A.2d 810, 811 (1954) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). 
92. See FED. R. EVID. 901. The rule provides as follows: 
Requirement of Authentication or Identification 
(a) General Provisions. The requirement of authentication or identi-
fication as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evi-
dence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is 
what its proponent claims. 
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of 
limitation, the following are examples of authentication or identifi-
cation conforming with the requirements of this rule: .... 
(6) Telephone Conversations. Telephone conversations, by evidence 
that a call was made to the number assigned at the time by the 
telephone company to a particular person or business, if (A) in the 
case of a person, circumstances, including self-identification, show the 
person answering to be the one called, or (B) in the case of a business, 
the call was made to a place of business· and the conversation related 
to business reasonably transacted over the telephone . . . . 
[d.; see also Archer v. Stat}:, 145 Md. 128, 149, 125 A. 744, 752 (1924) (holding 
that in order to admit as evidence a witness' telephone conversation, some 
preliminary testimony, either direct or circumstantial, must be presented to 
establish the identity of the other person to the conversation). 
But see Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Gardiner Dairy Co., 107 Md. 556, 572, 
69 A. 405, 411 (1908) (recognizing the exception to this rule in situations in 
which a witness may testify as to a telephone conversation with a person who 
"does not purport to be a particular person, but merely some member of the 
office staff authorized to make a contract or an admission"). 
93. 7 WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 2155; see also Knoedler v. State, 69 Md. App. 
764, 773, 519 A.2d 811, 815 (1987) ("authentication can be found either from 
evidence that the witness was familiar with and recognized the voice of the 
alleged caller, or, in the absence of such recognition 'sundry circumstances' 
(including other admissions and the like) may suffice"); Ford v. State, 11 Md. 
App. 654, 657, 276 A.2d 423, 424 (1971) ("[t)he admissions contained in the 
conversation are sufficient 'sundry circumstances' to authenticate the conver-
sation"). 
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identifying the unknown party to the telephone conversation, such 
as the testifying witness having knowledge of facts that only the 
proposed speaker would know. 94 This rule is generally followed in 
other jurisdictions.9s 
Authenticating a telephone conversation, however, does not re-
quire a judge to determine preliminary issues of fact, as is required 
for hearsay testimony.96 Instead, "if a prima facie showing is made, 
the ... statement comes in, and the ultimate question of authenticity 
is left to the jury."97 Moreover, the caller's identity does not need 
to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 98 Any conflicts in identity 
go to the weight of the evidence, and not to its admissibility. 99 
2. Use of the presumption that "identity of name gives rise to 
identity of person" as circumstantial evidence to prove identity of 
an individual 
Courts often use the presumption that identity of name gives 
rise to identity of person as circumstantial evidence to prove the 
identity of an out-of-court declarant. 1oo This presumption is a re-
buttable presumptionlOI which "helps the prosecution to make a 
prima facie case; once it has offered proof of the basic fact, the 
jury may, but is not required to, infer the 'presumed' fact."102 In 
the absence of any proof by the defense rebutting the presumed fact, 
"such proof is sufficient to warrant the jury in finding" the presumed 
facLI03 
Numerous factors will either strengthen or weaken the identity 
presumption. 
This presumption is slight when the name is common and 
there are many persons having the same name. It increases 
94. See Earnhart v. State, 582 S.W.2d 444, 448-49 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (stating 
authentication can occur through a witness testifying as to "knowledge of facts 
that only the speaker would be likely to know"). 
95. See Knoedler, 69 Md. App. at 773-74, 519 A.2d at 815 and cases cited therein. 
96. See MCCORMICK 4TH, supra note 47, § 227. 
97.Id. 
98.Id. 
99. See King V. State, 560 N.E.2d 491, 494-95 (Ind. 1990) (citing Ashley V. State, 
493 N.E.2d 768 (Ind. 1986); Reed V. State, 491 N.E.2d 182 (Ind. 1986». 
100. See Bowers V. State, 298 Md. 115, 130-31, 468 A.2d 101, 109 (1983) (citing 1 
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 103 (Charles E. Torcia ed., 13th ed. 1972»; 
State V. Brown, 257 S.W.2d 796, 799 (Tex. Ct. App. 1953); State V. Scriver, 
580 P.2d 265,270-71 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978); York V. State, 173 N.W.2d 693', 
698-99 (Wis. 1970); see also McLAIN, supra note 60, § 303.4; 1 WHARTON, 
supra, § 103; 9 WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 2529. 
101. A rebuttable presumption is often referred to as merely a "permissible infer-
, ence." MCCORMICK 4TH, supra note 47, § 342. 
102. McLAIN, supra note 60, § 303.2(a). 
103. Wright V. State, 198 Md. 163, 171-73, 81 A.2d 602, 606-07 (1951). 
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in strength with circumstances indicating the improbability 
of there being two persons of the same name at the same 
time and place, and where there is no evidence that there 
is any other person bearing that name. Identity, then, can 
be presumed from the names coupled with other circum-
stances .104 
When analyzing an identity presumption, courts are likely to 
confront two issues, both of which were addressed by the Woodson 
court. lOS The court must first determine how much corroborating 
evidence of identity, if any, is required to sustain the presumption 
and to allow the proposed evidence to go to a jury.106 Second, if 
enough corroborating evidence of identity is offered to sustain the 
presumption and to allow the admissibility of the evidence, but the 
presumption is rebutted by its opponent, then the court must deter-
mine whether the presumption is still allowed to go to the jury, or 
whether the presumption is nullified. 1OO 
104. Sallie v. State, 24 Md. App. 468, 482, 332 A.2d 316, 324 (1975) (quoting 1 
WHARTON, supra note 100, § 103). 
105. See infra section IV and accompanying discussion. 
106. See, e.g., People v. Casey, 77 N.E.2d 812, 816-17 (III. 1948) (holding that 
identity of name alone is insufficient to overcome a presumption of innocence 
in a criminal case and establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. 
Curtis, 338 So. 2d 662, 664 (La. 1976) (same); State v. Ransom, 500 S.W.2d 
585, 588 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (same); State v. Livermore, 196 P. 977, 977-78 
(Mont. 1921) (same); Bullard v. State, 533 S.W.2d 812, 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1976) (same). 
Compare State v. Shumate, 516 S.W.2d 297 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (holding 
that identity of name is sufficient to prove' identity of person) and State v. 
Walls, 167 S.E.2d 547, 548 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969) (same) and State v. Kilmer, 
153 N.W. 1089, 1091 (N.D. 1915) (same) and State v. Black, 42 P.2d 171, 
174-77 (Or. 1935) (same) and Ex Parte Moore, 436 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1968) (same) with Smith v. United States, 92 F.2d 460, 461 (9th 
Cir. 1937) (holding that identity of name together with confirmatory facts is 
sufficient to warrant an inference of identity of persons) and People v. Roy, 
59 Cal. Rptr. 636, 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (same) and People v. Reese, 179 
N.E. 305, 307 (N.Y. 1932) (same). 
107. See Commonwealth v. Middleton, 4 A.2d 533, 536 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1939); see 
also State v. Mendibles, 428 P.2d 127, 129 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967) (holding that 
when other evidence of identity conflicts with presumption, it is the jury's duty 
to weigh that evidence against the presumption and any evidence that may 
support the presumption to determine which, if any, preponderates); In re 
Estate of Nidever, 5 Cal. Rptr. 343 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (same); State 
v. Garrett, 574 P.2d 639, 641-42 (Or. 1978) (same). 
Compare State v. Mitchner, 124 S.E.2d 831 (N.C. 1962) (holding that the 
presumption is weak and shaken by the slightest proof of facts or showing of 
circumstances which produce a doubt of identity) with Graham v. State, 224 
U.S. 616,630 (1912) (citing general rule that the question of identity is ordinarily 
one for the jury). 
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Maryland courts have not established a clear standard regarding 
the necessity of producing corroborating evidence to sustain an 
identity presumption. Likewise, even assuming additional evidence is 
needed to sustain the presumption, Maryland courts have not artic-
ulated a clear standard to be used in determining how much corrob-
orating evidence is required. In some cases, Maryland courts have 
indicated that the presumption can stand alone without any corrob-
orating evidence, lOS while in other cases, Maryland courts have indi-
cated that additional corroborative evidence is needed to sustain the 
presumption. I09 In no case has the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
articulated a consistent standard to be used in determining the amount 
of additional evidence required to sustain the presumption. llo 
For example, in Bowers v. State,lll the court of appeals affirmed 
a trial court ruling that allowed presumptive evidence of an indivi-
dual's identity without any corroborating evidence to go to the jury.ll2 
The defendant did not provide specific rebuttal evidence, but merely 
denied the sufficiency of the presumption in proving identity. 113 
In Bowers, the defendant was arrested and charged with rape 
and murder. ll4 During interrogation by the police, the defendant 
confessed that an accomplice by the name of Alexander Peterson, 
who was "on the run from Chicago," had been involved in the rape 
and murder and was the one who actually strangled the victim to 
death.lls The State, in rebutting defendant's claim that another 
individual participated, offered evidence that someone named Alex-
ander Peterson had been in an Illinois prison at the time of the 
crime. ll6 The defendant claimed that, because there was no link 
between the State's Alexander Peterson and the Alexander Peterson 
in defendant's confession, the State's evidence should have been 
excluded. ll7 The trial court allowed the evidence. lls 
108. Bowers v. State, 298 Md. liS, 130-31, 468 A.2d 101, 109 (1983); Sallie, 24 
Md. App. at 482, 332 A.2d at 324. 
109. Murphy v. State, 47 Md. App. 387, 389-90, 422 A.2d 1297, 1298 (1980). 
110. In Murphy v. State, discussed infra notes 124-35 and accompanying text, the 
court did articulate a standard, but this standard has never been applied in 
other cases discussing the identity presumption. 
111. 298 Md. lIS, 468 A.2d 101 (1983) 
112. It should be noted that, unlike the Woodson court, the Bowers court was not 
addressing hearsay evidence. See Bowers, 298 Md. liS, 468 A.2d 101. The 
Bowers court did, however, address Maryland's treatment of the identity 
presumption within the context of a criminal confession. See id. Because of 
these similarities, Bowers is instructive. 
113. [d. at 130-31,468 A.2d at 109. 
114. [d. 
115. [d. 
116. [d. at 131, 468 A.2d at 109. 
117. [d. at 130, 468 A.2d at 109. 
118. [d. 
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On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed. The court stated that 
once the State located Peterson incarcerated in Illinois, a presumption 
of identity of persons arose.1l9 It then became the jurY's role to 
examine the evidence and determine whether the two individuals were 
the same individual referred to by the defendant. 120 "[I]t is for the 
jury to pick and sift, to stress and ignore, to believe and disbelieve, 
to weigh and assess, and resolve the conflicts in reaching a final 
decision to acquit or convict." 121 In reaching its decision, the court 
considered the fact that the name Alexander Peterson was not a 
traditional name. 122 Furthermore, the court noted that the defendant 
was not denied the opportunity during trial or during closing to offer 
contrary evidence to disprove the prosecutor's assertion.123 
In Murphy v. State,124 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
allowed presumptive evidence of identity to go to the jury, but 
implied that it did so because there was sufficient circumstantial 
evidence of identity to justify submission to the jury.12S The court 
did not elaborate, however, on whether this circumstantial evidence 
of identity was necessary for submission or whether, like Bowers, 
the presumption could have stood alone. 126 
In Murphy, the defendant was stopped for operating a motor 
vehicle with a "loud· exhaust. "127 The defendant was unable to 
produce a driver's license, and said his name was "Arvil Raymond 
Murphy."12s A check of driving records with the Motor Vehicle 
Administration revealed that the defendant's name was Raymond 
Arvil Murphy, and that the State had revoked his operator's license 
almost three months earlier. 129 On the sole basis of this record, the 
defendant was convicted of driving while his license was suspended 
and revoked. 130 
On appeal, the defendant questioned the sufficiency of the 
driving record as evidence of his identity. 131 The court of special 
appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the presumption of 
identity of name was sufficient to identify the defendant as the same 
119. [d. 
120. [d. 
121. [d. (quoting Thomas v. State, 32 Md. App. 465, 477, 361 A.2d 138, 146 
(1976». 
122. [d. at 131,468 A.2d at 109. 
123. [d. 
124. 47 Md. App. 387, 422 A.2d 1297 (1980). 
125. [d. at 389-90, 422 A.2d at 1298. 
126. [d. 
127. [d. at 388, 422 A.2d at 1297. 
128. [d. 
129. [d. 
130. [d. at 388-89, 422 A.2d at 1297. 
131. [d. at 389, 422 A.2d at 1297. 
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individual named in the driving record.132 The standard for allowing 
such evidence, the court stated, was that the evidence must "show 
directly, or support a rational inference of, the facts to be established, 
or the inference supported, beyond a reasonable doubt or to a moral 
certainty."133 The court found that even though the State should 
have provided additional evidence linking the defendant with the 
driving record (such as date of birth and residence), the driving 
record contained additional information (height, weight, race, and 
sex) which supplied sufficient circumstantial evidence to make the 
connection 134 and meet the standard for admissibility,I3S 
More recently, in McDonald v. State,136 the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland addressed the use of the identity presumption and 
concluded that likeness of names alone is insufficient to prove 
identity.137 In McDonald, defendant Kathleen McDonald was a par-
ticipant in an Alternative Sentencing Program (ASP), which monitors 
the progress of individuals on probation. 138 Such monitoring included 
drug testing. 139 The State attempted to revoke the defendant's pro-
bation after alleging that the defendant's urine tested positive for 
cocaine. 140 
In attempting to prove that the defendant used cocaine, the 
State tried to introduce into evidence two positive laboratory urinal-
ysis reports bearing the name Kathleen McDonald, reports which the 
defendant denied were applicable to her. 141 To prove that the samples 
came from the defendant, the State produced testimony from two 
witnesses. First, a witness from ASP spoke of her knowledge of 
ASP's records, which contained copies of the laboratory reports. 142 
Second, a technician from Maryland Medical Laboratories, Inc. 
(MML), which performs analysis of ASP urine samples, testified as 
to the process used in identifying and testing samples. 143 The MML 
technician had not performed analysis on any of the samples in 
question. l44 The MML technician testified that MML employees col-
lect the samples from ASP and deliver them to the MML laboratory, 
132. [d. at 389-90, 422 A.2d at 1298. 
133. [d. at 389, 422 A.2d at 1298 (quoting Vincent v. State, 220 Md. 232, 237, 151 
A.2d 898, 901 (1959». 
134. [d. at 389-90, 422 A.2d at 1298. 
135. [d. 
136. 314 Md. 271, 550 A.2d 696 (1988). 
137. /d. at 281-82, 550 A.2d at 701. 
138. [d. at 278, 550 A.2d at 699. 
139. /d. 
140. /d. 
141. [d. at 278-79, 550 A.2d at 699-700. 
142. [d. 
143. [d. at 279, 550 A.2d at 699. 
144. [d. at 278-79, 550 A.2d at 699. 
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where the sample is assigned an identification number consisting of 
six digits}4s When a sample tests positive upon an initial screening, 146 
the sample is then tested twice more using two more sophisticated 
procedures. 147 At each testing, technicians confirm the name on the 
sample. 148 The MML technician likewise testified that based on in-
formation contained in the worksheet, screening record and the final 
analysis report for the samples in question, "normal procedures were 
followed in each instance." 149 
The Circuit Court for Baltimore County ruled that the evidence 
was admissible, despite the fact that the State did not produce the 
lab technicians who tested the urine. ISO The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland reversed, holding that the State failed to establish a chain 
of custodylSI because it failed to offer evidence that a Kathleen 
McDonald ever gave urine samples to ASP, failed to explain how 
the samples were delivered to the MML courier, and failed to offer 
evidence on how ASP obtained, labeled, and stored the urine sam-
ples. 1S2 "We have nothing more than the delivery ... of urine samples 
labelled with the not uncommon name of Kathleen McDonald and 
the subsequent processing of those samples. That is simply not enough 
to authenticate the urine samples with the requisite degree of cer-
tainty." IS3 
B. Burden of Proof for Confessions 
A confession to a crime is "a particular kind of admission, 
governed by special rules"ls4 significantly different from the rules 
145. [d. 
146. The initial screening procedure is called "Thin Layer Chromatography." [d. 
at 279, 550 A.2d at 700. 
147. Positive results are "confirmed by the more specific Enzyme Multiple Immu-
noassay Technique and then by Gas Chromatography." [d. 
148. [d. 
149. [d. 
150. [d. at 278, 550 A.2d at 699. 
151. [d. at 281, 550 A.2e1 at 700. "[T]he State must establish the chain of custody-
that is a basic step in authenticating the evidence prior to its admission. It 
failed to do so here." [d. (citations omitted). 
152. [d. at 281, 550 A.2d at 701. 
153. [d. (citing Unigard Ins. Co. v. Elmore, 224 S.E.2d 762, 763 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1976) (holding that blood alcohol test results were inadmissible where there 
was no showing that a blood sample was ever taken from decedent); Priest v. 
McConnell, 363 N.W.2d 173, 178 (Neb. 1985) (holding that chemical analysis 
of urine samples was inadmissible where plaintiff failed to establish how or 
where the urine sample was taken from defendant); Newton v. City of Rich-
mond, 96 S.E.2d 775, 778-80 (Va. 1957) (holding that results of blood alcohol 
tests were inadmissible where evidentiary foundation showed only that vial of 
blood tested bore accused's name». 
154. MCCORMICK 4TH, supra note 47, § 262. 
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governing the admissibility of admissions of a party-opponent. While 
an admission entails only acknowledging facts tending to prove guilt 
but failing to establish all essential elements of the crime,lss a 
confession is a statement admitting all facts required to sustain a 
conviction of a particular crime. IS6 Because a confession admits every 
element of a case and is ordinarily given overwhelming weight by 
the jury, courts necessarily take precautions to avoid the prejudicial 
effect of untrustworthy confessions. 
One such precaution is embodied in the knowing and voluntary 
standard. Typically, a confession is admissible if, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, it was made knowingly and voluntarily.ls7 The judge, 
not the jury, determines whether the confession meets this burden. ISS 
Courts have had little occasion to address the admissibility of a 
criminal confession when doubt exists as to whether the confessor 
and the defendant are the same person; that is, when the identity of 
the confessor is in question at trial. The United States Supreme 
Court, however, has made clear that the heightened burden of proof 
in criminal cases (proof beyond a reasonable doubt) applies to the 
establishment of facts underlying the conviction, not to the admis-
sibility of a confession offered to prove these facts.1S9 "[T]he admis-
155. See Stewart v. State, 232 Md. 318, 193 A.2d 40 (1963). In Stewart, the court 
stated that 
[a] confession is a species of admission, that is to say, an admission 
that says or necessarily implies that the matter confessed constitutes 
a crime. An admission which is not a confession is an acknowledge-
ment of some fact or circumstance which, in itself, is insufficient to 
authorize a conviction but which tends to establish the ultimate fact 
of guilt. 
Id. at 323, 193 A.2d at 43; see also Merchant v. State, 217 Md. 61, 69, 141 
A.2d 487, 491 (1958) (labelling the difference between a confession and an 
admission a "clear distinction"); State v. Hallam, 575 P.2d 55, 62 (Mont. 
1978) ("an 'admission' concerns only some specific fact which, in turn, tends 
to establish guilt or some element of the offense") .. 
156. See Stewart, 232 Md. at 323, 193 A.2d at 43; see also State v. Schomaker, 
303 N.W.2d 129, 130 (Iowa 1981) ("confession is an acknowledgment in express 
terms by a party in a criminal case of his guilt of the crime charged"); Hallam, 
575 P.2d at 62 ("A 'confession' is an admission of crime itself."). 
157. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). 
158. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1963). 
159. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972). In Lego, the Court stated that the 
heightened burden of proof in criminal cases, that is proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, applies to the establishment of facts underlying the conviction, not to 
the admissibility of specific pieces of evidence offered to prove these facts. Id. 
at 486-87. The Court allowed a confession to be admissible even though its 
voluntariness was only proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 487. 
The Court held that a reasonable doubt standard was not offended "because 
the admissibility of a confession is determined by a less stringent standard." 
Id. 
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sibility of a confession is determined by a less stringent standard. "160 
Although not addressing confessions specifically, the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland, in Woodell v. State,161 held that "evidence 
need not be positively connected with the accused" to be admissible, 
but instead, evidence is admissible when "there is a probability of 
its connection with the accused for the crime, the lack of positive 
identification affecting the weight of the evidence, rather than its 
admissibility." 162 
When specifically addressing the admissibility of confessions not 
positively linked to the defendant, courts outside Maryland have 
typically permitted the admissibility of the evidence. When there is 
a probability of a connection with the defendant, the confession is 
admitted and any uncertainty of identity goes to the weight the jury 
should place on the confession, and not to its admissibility. 
For example, in State v. Scriver,163 the Court of Appeals of 
Washington held that uncertainty as to the identity of the out-of-
court confessor goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissi-
bility.l64 In Scriver, the defendant was arrested for shoplifting and 
possession of a controlled substance. 165 The store detective identified 
the defendant and gave the police officer her name: Carla Jean 
Engeseth. l66 Thereafter, the defendant, who was arrested as Carla 
Jean Engeseth, visited the office of her attorney for the purpose of 
making and signing a confession. 167 A notary public and legal sec-
retary of the defendant's attorney listened to and typed the confes-
sion, which the defendant then signed as "Carla J. Scriver." 168 Prior 
to trial, all drugs found in defendant's purse on the day of her arrest 
had been erroneously destroyed. 169 
At trial, neither the store detective, the arresting officer, nor the 
notary public could positively identify the defendant as the same 
individual who was arrested or who made and signed a confession. 170 
The notary public who typed and notarized the confession testified 
that the person who filled out the confession signed the confession 
as "Carla J. Scriver" and responded to "Ms. Scriver."l7l The de-
fendant objected to the admission of the confession as hearsay 
160. [d. at 487. 
161. 2 Md. App. 433, 234 A.2d 890 (1967). 
162. [d. at 436, 234 A.2d at 892. 
163. 580 P.2d 265 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978). 
164. [d. at 271 (citing State v. Spadoni; 243 P. 854, 857 (Wash. 1926». 
165. [d. at 266. 
166. [d. 
167. [d. 
168. [d. at 267. 
169. fd. 
170. [d. 
171. [d. at 270. 
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evidence172 and denied any connection between her and the confes-
sion. 173 The trial court admitted the confession. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Washington affirmed, 
holding that uncertainty as to the defendant's identity goes only to 
the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. 174 
[C]ertainly [the confession] has some bearing on the question 
whether the accused was guilty of the crime to show that 
the person committing it was of his general appearance, or 
to show that a person of his general appearance was seen 
in the vicinity of the place of the crime immediately prior 
to its commission. 17s 
The court held that the existence of the confession and the statements 
therein were proof of the elements of the crime and were properly 
admitted. 176 
Similarly, in Fischer v. State,177 the Court of Criminal Appeals 
of Texas held admissible a confession made to a police officer, 
despite the fact that the police officer could not identify the defendant 
at trial as the same individual who made the confession. 178 In Fischer, 
-the defendant was convicted of sending an anonymous letter .179 
Although the police officer who took the defendant's confession was 
unable to identify defendant at trial, the police officer did indicate 
that the one who confessed was named Estil Harlan Fischer, which 
matched the defendant's name. ISO The defendant objected to the 
admission of the confession. 181 The trial court admitted the confession 
and the appeals court affirmed. 182 The appeals court stated that the 
other evidence, establishing that it was the defendant who was taken 
to the police officer's office on the night of his arrest, was sufficient 
to establish that it was the defendant who confessed to the officer.183 
172. [d. at 268. Defendant also claimed, because the drugs had been destroyed, that 
there was no showing of relevancy of the confession. [d. 
173. [d. at 269-70. 
174. [d. at 271 (citing State v. Spadoni, 243 P. 854, 857 (Wash. 1926». 
175. [d. (quoting Spadoni, 243 P. at 857). 
176. [d. at 271. 
177. 361 S.W.2d 395 (Tx. Crim. App. 1962). 
178. [d. at 398. The Fischer court did not address the identity of names presumption. 
However, even if the court had -done so, it is likely the court would have 
reached the same result. Because the defendant in Fischer did not testify or 
offer any evidence in his defense, he did nothing to rebut the presumption. 
See id. at 397. 
179. Id. at 396. 
180. Id. at 398. 
181. [d. at 397. 
182. [d. at 397-98. 
183. [d. at 398. 
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Finally, in York v. State,184 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
likewise affirmed a trial court's admission of a confession when only 
circumstantial and presumptive evidence linked the identity of the 
confessor with the defendant. 18S In York, the defendant was convicted 
of burglary. 186 A detective testified that a man with the same name 
as the defendant confessed to him at 10 a.m., on March 22, 1968, 
but the detective was unable to identify the defendant at trial as the 
same individual who confessed .187 The defendant objected to the 
admission of the confession, claiming it was "hearsay and self-
serving." 188' The trial court admitted the confession and the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court affirmed. 189 In finding the confession admissible, 
Wisconsin's highest court looked to circumstantial evidence of the 
confessor's identity that linked him to the defendant. l90 For example, 
the State offered corroborating testimony by another detective, con-
firming that he had seen the police officer who took the confession 
questioning the defendant at 10 a.m., on March 22, 1968. 191 
IV. THE INSTANT CASE 
The court in Woodson began its analysis by stating that, prior 
to admitting a confession, there must be sufficient indicia that the 
confession was made by the defendant. l92 The State bears this burden 
of proving identity.193 In Woodson, the court found that the State 
failed to meet this burden primarily because the State failed to 
produce any records to establish that Woodson and Spells were ever 
held in the same cell. l94 Such evidence could have come in the form 
of jail records or testimony from guards or other individuals who 
may have seen Woodson and Spells in jail together .195 
The court recognized that the State produced some corroborating 
evidence, such as the fact that Spells knew Woodson's nickname and 
that Woodson had a mid-body injury, but that evidence alone was 
not sufficient to establish identity.l96 The court distinguished both 
184. 173 N.W.2d 693 (Wis. 1970). 
185. [d. at 695. 
186. [d. 
187. [d. at 698-99. 
188. [d. at 699. 
189. [d. 
190. [d. at 698-99. 
191. [d. at 699. 
192. Woodson v. State, 325 Md. 251, 260-61,600 A.2d 420, 424 (1992). 
193. [d. at 262, 600 A.2d at 424. 
194. [d. at 262, 600 A.2d at 425. 
195. [d. 
196. [d. at 263, 600 A.2d at 425. The court stated that 
[i]n this capitol prosecution, Spells's [sic] testimony concerning Wood-
1993] Woodson v. State 411 
York v. State l97 and Fischer v. State,198 on grounds that the propo-
nents of those confessions introduced sufficient evidence to establish 
the identity of the defendant as the individual who confessed. l99 
In addressing the presumption that "identity of name gives rise 
to identity of person," the court stated that, even if the use of 
Woodson's name by Spells' cellmate raised a rebuttable presumption, 
that presumption was nullified when Spells failed to identify the 
defendant at trial as the same individual.200 In effect, the inability of 
the witness to identify the defendant as being the out-of-court de-
clarant goes to the admissibility of the evidence and not to the weight 
that it should be given by the jury. The confession would only be 
admissible if the State made a prima facie showing that Spells' 
cellmate was Woodson, which the State failed to do. 201 
v. ANALYSIS 
The court's ruling in Woodson puts Maryland in the minority 
of jurisdictions that have ruled on this issue. The opinion, however, 
seems to emphasize the persuasive effect that confessions have on 
juries and places a much greater burden on the State when attempting 
to admit a hearsay confession when the identity of the confessor is 
uncertain. 
The court's analysis, however, ·is not without criticism, most 
notably in its dissenting opinion.202 The dissent criticized the height-
son's confession, if admitted and believed ... [would make) Woodson 
. . . eligible for the imposition of the death penalty . . . . In these 
circumstances, we think an evidentiary foundation beyond Spells's 
[sic) knowledge of Woodson's name was essential to show a linkage 
between the two men and the purported confession. 
[d. at 262, 600 A.2d at 425 (emphasis added). The court leaves one begging 
the question whether the fact that this was a death penalty proceeding height-
ened the evidentiary requirements, or whether, had the case been only a 
misdemeanor, more relaxed indicia of identity would have been sufficient. 
Interestingly, the majority opinion in Woodson did not distinguish either 
Murphy v. State, 47 Md. App. 387, 422 A.2d 1297 (1980) or Sallie v. State, 
24 Md. App. 468, 332 A.2d 316 (1975), in which the Court of Special Appeals 
of Maryland allowed evidence of identity based on the identity presumption 
and other circumstantial evidence, to be submitted to the jury. See supra notes 
124-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of Murphy. 
197. 173 N.W.2d 693 (Wis. 1970). 
198. 361 S.W.2d 395 (Tx. Crim. App. 1962). 
199. Woodson, 325 Md. at 261-62, 600 A.2d at 425. The court recognized the 
possibility that the State decided not to produce more evidence linking Spells 
and Woodson only after the trial court announced its decision to admit the 
confession. [d. at 262, 600 A.2d at 425. 
200. [d. at 263-64, 600 A.2d at 426. 
201. [d. at 264, 600 A.2d at 426. 
202. [d. at 268, 600 A.2d at 428 (Karwacki, J., dissenting). 
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ened standard the majority placed on the admissibility of confessions. 
Because the standard of proof for the admissibility of evidence is 
one of preponderance of the evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the proper test for admissibility of the confession is "whether 
the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that it was 
more likely than not that the defendant was the man who spoke to 
Spells on those occasions. "203 According to the dissent, the circum-
stantial evidence of identity provided "a sufficient basis for the 
admission Of those oral admissions despite Spells' inability to identify 
Woodson at trial. "204 
Moreover, the majority opinion appears to remove from the jury 
what was once within their purview. Traditionally, once the identity 
presumption arose, it was the jury's duty "to pick and sift, to stress 
and ignore, to believe and disbelieve, to weigh and assess, and resolve 
the conflicts in reaching a final decision. " lOS The dissent noted that 
the identity presumption was sufficiently supported by circumstantial 
evidence when considering that the name "Shawn Woodson" is not 
common, that Spells knew Woodson's nickname, and that Spells 
knew Woodson had a mid-body injury.206 As such, "it was for the 
jury to determine the weight to be accorded that inference."207 
Likewise, the majority opinion did not address the significance 
of the defendant's failure to present any evidence to rebut the identity 
presumption, which Woodson could have done during the trial or 
during closing arguments. In Bowers, for example, the court allowed 
an identity presumption to go to the jury partly because the defendant 
"was not denied the opportunity to offer contrary· evidence to 
disprove the State's assertion."208 Other than the fact that Spells 
could not identify Woodson as the same man as his cellmate, the 
fact that the defendant did not actively present evidence rebutting 
the State's assertion did not appear to be a factor in the Woodson 
analysis. 
Moreover, it is unclear whether the court's obvious concern with 
the fact that Woodson wa.s a death penalty case changed the analysis 
for admitting hearsay confessions. 209 Although the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland has allowed an identity presumption to go to 
the jury for less severe offenses,210 the Woodson court neither ad-
dressed nor distinguished those cases. 
203. [d. at 269, 600 A.2d at 428. 
204. [d. at 269, 600 A.2d at 428-29. 
205. [d. at 270, 600 A.2d at 429 (quoting Thomas v. State, 32 Md. App. 465, 477, 
361 A.2d 138, 146 (1976». 
206. [d. at 271, 600 A.2d at 429-30. 
207. [d. at 271, 600 A.2d at 430. 
208. Bowers v. State, 298 Md. 115, 131,468 A.2d 101, 109 (1983). 
209. See supra note 196. 
210. See Murphy v. State, 47 Md. App. 387, 422 A.2d 1297 (1980); Sallie v. State, 
24 Md. App. 468, 332 A.2d 316 (1975). 
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Finally, the Woodson court specifically noted that sufficient 
proof is required to link the defendant with the confessor before a 
hearsay confession is admissible, but it failed to elaborate on the 
quantity of evidence required to sufficiently establish identity. The 
court only stated that because the State failed to offer evidence that 
Spells and Woodson were cellmates, it did not meet its burden of 
establishing identity. Only a prima facie showing of identity would 
,have been sufficient.2I1 The court in Woodson leaves open the ques-
tion of whether, had the State offered evidence confirming that Spells 
and Woodson were cellmates, the presumption would still be nullified 
by Spells' inability to identify Woodson. 
VI. IMPACT IRAMIFICATION 
The holding in Woodson is very narrow, specifically limited to 
cases involving both identity presumptions and oral hearsay confes-
sions. It is unlikely that the court's treatment of the identity pre-
sumption in Woodson will apply to those factual situations not 
involving confessions. However, the holding in Woodson undoubtedly 
places a greater burden on the State in introducing hearsay confes-
sions. This burden is magnified when the delay between the giving 
of the confession and the trial is great enough such that memories 
fade and those who heard the confession are no longer able to 
recognize the defendant as the confessor. 
It is likely that, had the State in Woodson offered evidence that 
Spells and Woodson were cellmates, the fact that Spells could not 
identify Woodson as the out-of-court confessor would not have 
nullified the presumption. The same would probably hold true if 
Spells had made an in-court identification of Woodson, even if the 
State had not offered evidence that the two were cellmates. What 
the Woodson decision requires, therefore, at least when dealing with 
confessions and identity presumptions, is not so much sufficient 
circumstantial evidence of the identity of the out-of-court confessor, 
but some evidence connecting the testifying witness with the out-of-
court confessor. This evidence must be independent of the testimony 
provided by the testifying witness. ' 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Maryland is in the minority of jurisdictions in holding that the 
inability to make an in-court identification of the defendant as an 
out-of-court confessor, despite exactness of names and other circum-
stantial evidence of identity, goes to the admissibility rather than to 
the weight of the evidence. Although it is probable that Maryland 
211. Woodson, 325 Md. at 264, 600 A.2d at 426. 
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courts would allow the admissibility of a confession despite an 
inability to make an in-court identification as long as sufficient 
circumstantial evidence of identity exists, it is not clear exactly what 
constitutes sufficient circumstantial evidence of identity. Whereas 
identity of those involved in only minor offenses can be established 
by the identity presumption corroborated by circumstantial evidence, 
it is not clear whether increased evidence of identity is required in 
death penalty cases. No clear test has been articulated in the cases 
addressing these issues, making the issues ripe for decision. 
Roberta C. Sino pole 
